Abstract-As more and more services and applications are emerging in the Internet, exposing user sensitive data in the Internet becomes more easily. The simplest way to protect the security of sensitive user data is to encrypt the data in advance, and then disclose the data decryption key only to those authorized users. However, the sensitive user data will be leaked while the decryption key is exposed to unauthorized users. In this paper, we propose a secure self-destructing scheme for electronic data (SSDD for short). We achieve this goal by first encrypting the data, and then distributing both the decryption key and a part of the ciphertext into the distributed hash table (DHT) network. By security analysis, we show that our SSDD scheme can resist against not only the traditional cryptanalysis and the brute-force attacks, but also the attacks in the DHT network, such as the store sniffing attack, the lookup sniffing attack, and the standard DHT attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of computer network and communications technology, exposing user sensitive data in the Internet becomes more easily. Without much attention to this problem, it will result in the breakout of leaking messages, e.g., emails will be leaked by service providers for gaining profits or supporting investigation. The most important reason for exposing sensitive user data is that the user data will be stored on a third party for a long time, which may not be controlled by the user himself [1] .
Considering the following scenario (see Fig. 1 ): Alice, a senior manager in Company A, communicates with Bob, a corporate spy in Company B, through emails. Obviously, both of them hope their emails to be kept confidential against any others. The simplest way to protect the security of sensitive user data is to encrypt the data in advance, and disclose the data decryption key only to those authorized users. However, the sensitive user data will be leaked while the decryption key is exposed to unauthorized users.
In the above scenario, even if the emails are encrypted under a key only shared by Alice and Bob, they will be exposed when Company B detects any wrong behaviors conducted by Alice and Bob, and then forces them to hand over their keys by legal means. So, the traditional encryption schemes are insufficient for the above scenario, since they are designed to protect against adversaries without accessing to the decryption keys. In order to solve this problem, we need an efficient scheme, which enables the sensitive user data to be automatically destructed when the data is no longer useful for the user. The self-destructing scheme, which enables users to control over the lifetime of their sensitive data, is broadly applicable in current Web-centered world. As one of the most promising schemes in such a field, Geambasu et al [2] proposed a scheme (from here on referred to as the Geambasu scheme), which stores the shares of the data decryption key in a large and public distributed hash table (DHT) network, rather than disclosing the data decryption key directly to authorized users as the traditional cryptographic systems. It enables the electronic data to be destroyed automatically after a period of time without the use of any explicit delete operation by the user or the parties storing that data, due to the key property of DHT which makes room for newer data by discarding older data after a specified time.
However, there is an evident shortcoming in their scheme, in which only the decryption key is destructed, and the entire ciphertext is still reachable. Therefore, the adversaries can use the traditional attacking method, such as the cryptanalysis or the brute force attacks [3] , to successfully breach the ciphertext, even when the decryption key is no longer available.
Considering this shortcoming, we propose a secure self-destructing scheme for electronic data (SSDD for short) which makes both the decryption key and the ciphertext destructed to better preserve the data security. Our contributions are threefold: 1) Our scheme can make the electronic data automatically destructed after a period of time without the use of any explicit delete operation by the user or any third parties. 2) Our scheme not only does not require any dedicated secure hardware and infrastructure, but also does not rely on any trusted third parties. 3) Our scheme can resist against not only the traditional cryptanalysis and the brute-force attacks, but also the attacks in the DHT network, by destructing both the decryption key and a part of the ciphertext in the DHT network. Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, we introduce some related work in Section 2, and provide assumptions, design goals and models of our scheme in Section 3. Then, we give some preliminaries in Section 4, and introduce some definitions in our scheme in Section 5. Next, we construct our scheme in Section 6, and analyze the security in Section 7. Finally, we present our future work and conclude this paper in Section 8.
II. RELATED WORK
To prevent the electronic data from being leaked, a natural way is to delete the sensitive data manually. There are many available electronic data destruction tools, such as, software erasure programs, degaussing equipments, shredding equipments, and so on [4] , [5] , [6] . However, emails and other Web data are stored on servers, which may not be controlled by the user himself. So, this kind of approach seems infeasible. It is worth noticing that a user can delete an email on the client freely, but has no idea about whether the email is really destructed or still kept on the email server by the service provider.
Another alternative approach is to simply apply the traditional encryption schemes by disclosing the decryption keys only to authorized users. However, as discussed previously, it is insufficient to apply only cryptographic approaches to our application scenario, due to the fact that the decryption key may be disclosed to unauthorized users in some cases.
An approach which seems to be suitable for the above scenario is the Ephemerizer family of solutions [7] , [8] , [9] . This kind of approaches require one or more trusted third parties to keep the data decryption key for the user and destroy the key after a specified time. The biggest shortcoming of such kind of solutions is that the trusted third parties may be untrustworthy in certain cases, e.g., they may expose the decryption keys to support government investigation or make profits [10] .
Another alternative approach for destructing data is the self-destructing scheme, which works by encrypting data and then controlling the lifetime of the decryption key, such as by scheduling the automatic deletion of the key after a predetermined time [11] . Geambasu et al [2] extended this idea and proposed the Geambasu scheme which enables the electronic data to be automatically destroyed after a period of time. Their scheme uses the symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt each message and stores the shares of the decryption key in a large and public DHT network rather than disclosing the decryption key to authorized users. A DHT network, which has a property of making room for newer data by discarding older data after a period of time, enables the decryption key to be unrecoverable, by discarding the shares of the decryption key permanently after a period of time. Therefore, no one can decrypt the ciphertext without the decryption key, so that the data is destructed in a sense. However, there is an evident shortcoming in their scheme.
In their scheme, only the decryption key is destructed and the entire ciphertext stored on the servers can be still easily obtained. That is to say, the data is not destructed really, so that an adversary may compromise the ciphertext, when he initiates the traditional cryptanalysis or the bruteforce attacks on the ciphertext. In terms of the bruteforce attacks, the security of their scheme is closely related to the length of the symmetric secret key. For example, the DES encryption algorithm cannot defeat the brute-force attacks because of its small size of key space (the length of the DES encryption key is only 56 bits). With the rapid development of cloud computing, users can enjoy powerful computing and storage resources as a supercomputer at a very low cost. If the adversaries can pay numerous cloud servers for implementing the brute-force attacks, the traditional symmetric encryption schemes may be breached in a finite time [12] . Therefore, we need to propose new encryption algorithms with a big enough key space to defeat the brute-force attacks.
In our scheme, we not only distribute the decryption key into the DHT network as Geambasu et al [2] , but also distribute a part of the "extracted" ciphertext into the DHT network. As a result, the ciphertext will never be decrypted unless getting both the decryption key and the complete ciphertext. In terms of the brute-force attacks on the incomplete ciphertext, the security of our scheme is closely related to the length of both the decryption key and the missing ciphertext. Therefore, our scheme makes a significant increase in the key space in a sense, so as to resist against the brute-force attacks effectively. Furthermore, the ciphertext which is stored on the servers is incomplete, so the traditional cryptanalysis attacks will fail.
III. ASSUMPTIONS, DESIGN GOALS, AND MODELS
To form a basis of our scheme, we first introduce the notion of a vanishing data object (V DO) [2] . A V DO encapsulates the user data (such as a file or a message) to prevent its contents from persisting indefinitely on the third parties and becoming a source of the retroactive information leakage. Regardless of whether a V DO is copied, transmitted, or stored in the Internet, it becomes unreadable after a predefined period of time.
A. Assumptions
We make several key assumptions, which mainly follow those in Geambasu et al [2] .
1) Time-limited value. The self-destructing scheme is used to protect the security of the sensitive data which is only valuable to the user for a limited period of time. 2) Predefined timeout. When a user encapsulates his data into a V DO, he knows the approximate lifetime of the V DO. 3) Internet connectivity. A user is able to connect to the Internet when sending the key shares, which are generated according to the decryption key, the extracted ciphertext and the corresponding extracted position, to the DHT network and decapsulating the V DO before it expires. 4) No attacks on a V DO before it expires. The target of our scheme is to defend the sensitive user data against future attacks. An adversary does not know what specific data to attack until the data has expired. It means that the V DO will not be attacked until it expires. 5) Trusted authorized users. The authorized users who have access to the same V DO must trust each other, and will not store any copy of the plaintext which is recovered from the V DO.
B. Design Goals
After describing these assumptions, we state the following design goals for our SSDD scheme (The first three goals follow those in Geambasu et al [2] ): 1) Automatic destruction after a specified time.
The sensitive data must be destructed automatically and without any explicit action by the users or any third party storing the V DO. against not only the traditional cryptanalysis and the brute-force attacks, but also some attacks in the DHT network, such as the store sniffing attack, the lookup sniffing attack, and the standard DHT attacks.
C. System Model
We assume that our targeted systems are composed of the following parties: data owners, authorized users, service providers, nodes in the DHT network, and potential adversaries. A data owner sends his V DO to a service provider, and the service provider is responsible for storing the V DO and ensuring only the authorized users to obtain the sensitive data. The nodes in the DHT network are responsible for storing the key shares. According to the fourth assumption, the potential adversaries would attack the V DO after it expires. Furthermore, the potential adversaries would attack the DHT network before the expired time, since all the key shares are destructed after the expired time.
D. Security Model
Our goal is to protect against the retroactive data disclosures, e.g., in response to a subpoena, court order, malicious compromise of archived data, and accidental data leakage. As described above, in our scheme, the authorized users trust each other and the potential adversaries would attack the V DO after it expires, or attack the DHT network before the expired time. In our security model, the potential adversaries can be classified into two types: The adversaries initiating attacks on the V DO after the expired time, and the adversaries initiating attacks on the DHT network before the expired time. For instance, both the service provider, who may provide the V DO in order to assist the future subpoenas, and the lawyer of Company B, who may try to get the context of the sensitive data through legal means, traditional cryptanalysis and brute-force attacks, fall into the first kind; The adversaries, who may store the key shares in the DHT network before the expired time, fall into the second kind.
IV. PRELIMINARIES

A. Overview of DHT
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a distributed data structure, which is an infrastructure for storing, managing and querying data in distributed systems or P2P networks [14] , [15] , [16] . A DHT generally provides a put/get interface for reading and storing data, which is implemented internally by three operations: lookup, get, and store [16] , [17] , [18] .
The two key properties of a DHT make it extremely appealing for our SSDD scheme. First, it makes room for newer data by discarding older data after a set time so that both the decryption key and a part of the ciphertext are destructed after a period of time. Second, the properties of huge size, geographic distribution and decentralization make the attacks in the DHT network on our scheme challenging [13] , [19] , [20] .
B. Lagrange Polynomial
Suppose that the interpolation polynomial is in the form:
Given a set of n + 1 points in L(x):
where no two points are the same, the interpolation polynomial in the Lagrange form is a linear combination of Lagrange basis polynomials:
where
It means that when given more than n different points in L(x), we can reconstruct the unique n degree polynomial L(x) [21] .
C. Outline of the Geambasu Scheme
The Geambasu scheme uses the symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt each message and stores the shares of the decrypton key in a large and public DHT network rather than disclosing the decryption key to authorized users. The DHT network, which erases older data after a period of time to make room for newer data, enables the keys to disappear after a predictable time without any manual intervention. The Geambasu scheme consists of two principal stages. The first stage is Encapsulation which encapsulates the data object D to a V DO. The second stage is Decapsulation which decapsulates a V DO to the data object D before the V DO expires. Fig. 2 shows the working process of the Geambasu scheme.
Encapsulation Stage.
(1) Setup: The algorithm takes a sufficiently large security parameter P as input, and outputs system parameters params and a random encryption K. The system parameters params=(n, t, E); (2) Encryption: The algorithm takes a sensitive data D, a random decryption key K and the system parmeters params as input, and then encrypts the data D under the random key K to output the ciphertext C; (3) KeySharesGenerate: The algorithm uses the Shamir secret sharing [22] to split the key K into n shares K 1 , . . . , K i , . . . , K n where t shares are required to reconstruct the key; (4) KeySharesDistribute: The algorithm chooses a random access key L, which is used as a seed to a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). The algorithm runs PRNG to derive n indices I 1 , . . . , I i , . . . , I n . For i = 1, . . . , n, it stores key share K i at index I i in the DHT network; (5) V DOGenerate: The algorithm takes the access key L, the ciphertext C, and the system parameters params as input, and outputs the V DO in the form of (L, C, n, t). Then, the V DO is sent to the servers.
Decapsulation Stage. The decapsulation algorithm accepts a V DO = (L, C, params) as input. The algorithm seeds PRNG with the access key L to retrieve n indices I 1 , . . . , I i , . . . , I n . It then retrieves more than t−1 key shares from the DHT network at these indices, and uses the Shamir secret sharing on t shares to reconstruct the key K. Finally, it decrypts C using K to obtain D. 
V. OVERVIEW OF OUR SCHEME
A. Scheme Definition
We introduce our SSDD scheme by presenting the following eight algorithms. Fig. 3 gives the description of notations used in our scheme. Fig. 3 . The notations used in our scheme description
1) Setup(P )→ (params,K):
The user takes a sufficiently large security parameter P as input, and outputs system parameters params and a random encryption key K.
2) Encryption(params,K,M ) → (C):
The user takes the system parameters params, the encryption key K and the message M as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext C.
3) DataExtract(params, C) → (ED, EP, C ):
The user takes the system parameters params and the ciphertext C as inputs, and outputs the extracted data ED, the extracted position EP , and the processed ciphertext C .
4) PolynomialGenerate(params, K, ED, EP
The user takes the system parameters params, the random encryption key K, the extracted data ED, and the extracted position EP as inputs, and outputs three ploynomials
The user takes the system parameters params and the three ploynomials
as inputs, and outputs the key shares KS.
6) KeySharesDistribute(KS) → (L):
The user takes the key shares KS as inputs, and outputs the access key L.
7) VDOGenerate(L, C , params) → (V DO):
The algorithm takes the access key L, the extracted ciphertext C , and the system parameters as inputs, and outputs the V DO in the form of (L, C , params). Then, the V DO is sent to the servers.
8) PlaintextRecover(V DO) → (M ):
The user takes the V DO as input, and outputs the plaintext M .
VI. CONSTRUCTION OF OUR SCHEME
A. Algorithmic Descriptions of Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we construct our SSDD scheme by describing the following eight algorithms: 1) Setup: Given the security parameter P , the algorithm generates the number of key shares n, the threshold value t, the number of bits in each extraction q, a function Len : {0, 1} * → Z (Z is the length of {0, 1} * ), a symmetric encryption algorithm E : ({0, 1}
* , and a random key K. The system parameters params=(n,t,q,Len,E). 2) Encryption: Given a plaintext M , the random encryption K and the system parameters, the algorithm encrypts the plaintext M using K and gets the ciphertext C = E(M, K). 3) DataExtract: Given the encrypted ciphertext C and the system parameters params, for i = 1, . . . , t, the algorithm first picks a random integer
, and then extracts the bits located in
We denote the extracted data as m i , and C (i+1) as the ciphertext after the i-th extraction. Notice that C (1) = C. We denote the whole extracted data as a tuple ED in the form of (m 1 , . . . , m i , . . . , m t ) , and the corresponding extracted position as a tuple EP in the form of (p 1 , . . . , p i , . . . , p t ) . The extracted ciphertext is denoted as C . 4) PolynomialGenerate: Given ED = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m t ), EP = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p t ), K, and the system parameters params, the algorithm first divides K into t pieces, which is in the form of (k 1 , . . . , k i , . . . , k t ). Then, the algorithm generates three polynomials as follows:
and
5)
KeySharesGenerate: Given the three polynomials F 1 (x), F 2 (x), F 3 (x) and the system parameters params, the algorithm picks random natural values x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . , x n which are larger than 1, for i = 1, . . . , n, sets
. Finally, we can get n different key shares, which are denoted as KS = (ks 1 , . . . , ks i , . . . , ks n ). 6) KeySharesDistribute: Given KS = (ks 1 , . . . , ks i , . . . , ks n ), the algorithm chooses a random access key L, which is used as a seed to a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Then, the algorithm runs PRNG to derive n indices I 1 , . . . , I i , . . . , I n . For i = 1, . . . , n, it stores key files ks i at index I i in the DHT network. 7) VDOGenerate: Given the access key L, the extracted ciphertext C , and the system parameters params, the algorithm generates the vanshing data object V DO which is in the form of (L, C , params). Then, V DO is sent to the servers. 8) PlaintextRecover: Given the vanshing data object V DO = (L, C , params) before the expiration time, the algorithm seeds PRNG with the access key locator L to retrieve more than t − 1 indices in I 1 , . . . , I n . It retrieves the key shares from the DHT network at these indices. Then, it uses Lagrange's interpolation to reconstruct the three polynomials and gets ED, EP and K. Next, it uses ED, EP and K to reconstruct C. Finally, it decrypts C with K to get M .
B. Outline of the SSDD scheme
We outline the SSDD scheme as follows: (Fig. 4 shows the working process of the SSDD scheme.) Encapsulation: (1) The user runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system parameters params and a random encryption key K; (2) To encrypt the plaintext M under the random encryption key K, the user runs the Encryption algorithm to output the ciphertext C; (3) To extract some data from C, the user runs the DataExtract algorithm and gets C ; (4) To generate the polynomials, the user runs the P olynomialGenerate algorithm to generate three polynomials F 1 (x), F 2 (x), F 3 (x); (5) To generate the key shares, the user runs the KeySharesGenerate algorithm to generate n different key shares KS; (6) To distribute the key shares into the DHT network, the user runs the KeySharesDistribute algorithm to send the n key shares into the DHT network; (7) To generate V DO, the user runs the V DOGenerate algorithm to generate V DO and sends it to the servers.
Decapsulation: Given a V DO before the expiration time, the user runs the P laintextRecover algorithm to recover the plaintext M . In our scheme, we assume that an adversary cannot attack a V DO stored on the servers before the expired time of the V DO. Furthermore, because the users do not know the decryption key and due to the characteristics of the DHT network, the key shares distributed into the DHT network will be discarded, so that the decryption key is unrecoverable due to the characteristics of the DHT network. Therefore, there are two ways to breach our scheme: The first one is to use the cryptanalysis or the brute-force attacks to breach the ciphertext stored on the servers after the expired time; The second one is to collect the key shares distributed in the DHT network before they disappear to decrypt the ciphertext. Correspondingly, the security of our scheme depends on two aspects: The security of the encryption algorithm to resist against the cryptanalysis or the brute-force attacks, and the security of DHT to resist against the attacks in the DHT network. In this section, we will analyze the security of our proposed scheme based on the two aspects. Table 1 compares our scheme with the Geambasu scheme.
1) The security of the encryption algorithm
In our scheme, not only the plaintext is encrypted by a random key, but also the ciphertext is extracted. Because the ciphertext is extracted, the plaintext will never be recovered without the complete ciphertext and the decryption key.
The brute-force attack works by continually trying every possible decryption key based on the complete ciphertext. In our scheme, we run the DataExtract algorithm to make the ciphertext incomplete. So, the adversary needs to recover the complete ciphertext before implementing the brute-force attack. Due to the construction of the DataExtract algorithm, the only way to recover the original ciphertext is to obtain all the extracted ciphertext and the extracted position. Therefore, in our scheme, the key space is related to the length of the random encryption key, the length of the extracted data, and the length of the extracted position. It makes a significant increase in the key space. For example, in our scheme, if the length of the random encryption key is L 1 bits, and we extract L 2 bits from the ciphertext (the length of the extracted position is L 3 bits), and thus, the key space increases from
. It means that the difficulty of the bruteforce attack to our SSDD scheme is 2 (L 2 +L 3 ) times than the Geambasu scheme. Therefore, our scheme can defeat the brute-force attack effectively. Another remarkable advantage of our scheme is that we do not depend heavily on the encryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm with a small key space such as DES can still be used in our scheme, and will not have a great impact on the security of our scheme.
Furthermore, because the premise of executing the traditional cryptanalysis attacks requires the adversary to first obtain the complete ciphertext, and the ciphertext stored on the servers is incomplete, the traditional cryptanalysis attacks will fail.
2) The security of the DHT network As described in Geambasu et al [2] , the architecture and standard properties of the DHT network bring significant challenges to the adversaries who want to obtain the key shares before it expires. They have made a detailed analysis on the attacks in the DHT network and also made experiments on a private deployment of the Vuze DHT [17] . The experimental results show that it is infeasible for the adversaries to obtain most of the key shares before the expired time, by initiating attacks on the DHT network, such as the store sniffing attack, the lookup sniffing attack, the standard DHT attacks, and so on. Therefore, in our scheme, an adversary cannot obtain a sufficient set of key shares to recover the decryption key and the extracted ciphertext from the DHT network. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
As more and more services and applications are emerging in the Internet, controlling the lifetime of sensitive data is extremely challenging. Even if users cleanse their local files, the copies may be retained on the servers of the service providers, which may be targets of theft or subpoena. In this paper, we proposed a secure self-destructing scheme for electronic data (SSDD for short) for protecting the security of electronic data. We achieved this goal by first encrypting the data, and then distributing both the key shares of the decryption key and a part of the ciphertext into the DHT network. By security analysis, we showed that our scheme can resist against not only the traditional cryptanalysis and the brute-force attacks, but also the attacks in the DHT network.
There are some limitations in the existing DHT for destructing-like applications. For example, the fixed data timeout in Vuze [18] . Therefore, an exciting direction of our future research is to redesign the existing DHT for our specific security applications.
